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The Feasibility of Alternative IMF-Type 
Stabilization Programs in Mexico, 1983-87 
Robert E. Looney and P. C. Frederiksen, 
Naval Postgraduate School 
In November 1982, Mexico announced an agreement with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) on a program to ease the country's large foreign debt. Mexico may receive 
nearly $4 billion worth of credit if the government reduces the deficit, raises taxes and curbs 
imports. This article investigates whether an IMF program like this can work in Mexico 
without a serious and immediate economic contraction. A model is constructed to examine 
the impact of government fiscal activity under alternative stabilization programs. The 
analysis suggests a critical element for success is the ability and willingness to raise tax 
revenues. 
INTRODUCTION 
The year 1978 represented the beginning of a period of rapid economic growth 
for the Mexican economy. Based on rising oil revenues, foreign loans and 
investments, and relative political stability, investment, consumption, and income 
rose at impressive rates. By the early 1980s the growth process faltered. Mexico 
experienced rising inflation, declining productivity, structural imbalances in most 
labor markets, and catastrophic rural emigration. As a result, in February 1982 
there began a major economic crisis that threatened to choke off the process of 
economic growth for the foreseeable future. To many observers (Riding 1981; 
Friedman 1982; Dorfman 1982) the injection of massive oil incomes after 1977 
only exacerbated many of the long-standing problems faced by Mexico. 
On November 10, 1982, the Mexican government announced an agreement 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a program to ease Mexico's large 
foreign debt. Under the agreement Mexico may receive $3.84 billion worth of 
credit from the IMF over the next three· years. To qualify, the government must 
drastically reduce its deficit, raise taxes, and curb imports. 
The purpose of this article is to examine the feasibility and consequences on the 
Mexican economy of various IMF "type" stabilization programs during the de la 
Madrid presidency ( 1982-87). 
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RECENT ECONOMIC TRENDS 
The government's economic program for the 1977-82 period defined the first 
two years as a period of "stabilization and inflation control." This was to be 
followed by a period of"consolidation" of stability in 1979 and 1980, and finally 
by a period of accelerated growth in 1981 and 1982. This program was to rely 
heavily on public expenditure and exchange policies: Among the most outstanding 
achievements of this policy were the high rate of growth of the economy ( 8.5 
percent in 1978-81 ), a substantial increase in employment, a rapid growth of 
agricultural output, and a high rate of expansion of productive capacity. Indeed, 
the investment rate (gross investment as a proportion of GDP) amounted to 
approximately 29 percent in 1981 compared with 23 percent in 1976. 
By 1981 the process had faltered. External factors such as the decline in 
demand for oil and increased world interest rates led to a current account deficit of 
$11. 7 billion in 1981. Internal policies adopted in Mexico exacerbated the 
problem. While the country's growth policy resulted in an average annual real 
economic growth of 8.2 percent between 1978 and 1981, the long-term growth 
capacity of the economy was only about 6 percent. Serious levels of inflation were 
experienced. In addition, the inability to r'!form the tax system led to higher and 
higher budget deficits-reaching 16 percent of GDP in 1982. (Cline 1982, pp. 
108-109). The exchange rate also aggravated the problem since the government 
was determined to maintain a nearly fixed rate during the 1977-80 period despite 
23 percent annual inflation. 
The current ( 1982) economic crisis is therefore the result of the unfavorable 
results in the balance of payments, the accelerated inflationary process, and the 
high level of external debt. In January 1982, the Bank of Mexico withdrew from 
the dollar market and allowed the peso to float freely. By the end of the year, the 
peso had fallen to around 160 per dollar-a decline of over 5 50 percent for the 
year. 
On November 10, 1982, the Mexican government reached an agreement with 
the IMF to provide the country with $3.84 billion in credit over the next three 
years on the condition that Mexico adopted certain austerity measures (IMF, 
1983). This "letter of intent" has diminished the risk that Mexico would announce 
a temporary moratorium on its debt. The letter represents a first step in a process 
to arrive at a final IMF loan package. It outlines a proposed three-year economic 
adjustment program for Mexico. (Riding 1982). The main thrust of the program is 
to reduce the deficit, which is expected to reach 16.5 percent of the country's GNP 
by 1982. 
In the letter, Mexico agrees to limit its deficit to 8.5, 5.5, and 3.5 percent in 
1983, 1984, and 1985, respectively, implying severe cuts in public spending. 
Mexico's other committment was that the public sector debt could not increase by 
more than $5 billion in 1983 (to include the first $1.28 billion in IMF credits). The 
government successfully argued against removing exchange controls, eliminating 
the three-tier exchange rate, or raising domestic interest rates-all of which had 
been sought by the Fund. Instead, the government 5)romised only to maintain an 
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exchange rate to stimulate exports and discourage both imports and the flight of 
capital. 
The purpose of this article is to determine whether or not a program as suggested 
in the IMF letter can work in Mexico without a serious and immediate contraction 
of the economy. The following sections describe the model, and present the results 
of four simulations of the Mexican economy between 1981 and 1987. 
THE MODEL 
The model was constructed to examine the impact of government fiscal activity 
under alternative stabilization programs. Inasmuch, a relatively large number of 
public sector variables appear in the final estimated equations. In addition, the 
problems examined by Fitzgerald ( 1979), especially the issue of crowding out, can 
best be analyzed within the context of a simultaneous macroeconomic model of 
this type. 
It has been suggested that Keynesian relationships are more likely to be 
prevalent in Mexico than the linkages hypothesized by either the monetarists or 
Cambridge group (Looney 1982). The model was therefore constructed largely 
along Keynesian lines. Of the two instrumental variables, government investment 
is assumed to be exogenous and controlled by the authorities for demand 
management, and the Bank of Mexico credit to the government is assumed to be 
controlled by the central bank and acts as a credit rationing device. The money 
supply is endogenously determined. 
The individual equations with the expected signs of the coefficients appear as 
Appendix 1.1 The following highlights are noted: 
Equation ( 1 ): "Crowding out" of private cqnsumption occurs as a result of 
direct government expenditures (GENANP). 
Equation (2): Private investment is stimulated by both direct government 
expenditure and in particular government investment (IGP). 
Equation ( 4): A dummy variable (DUMPET) is included in the government 
consumption equation to reflect the jump in oil exports beginning in 1977. 
Equations (6) and (7): The sign of the exchange rate in the export and import 
equations indicates that a devaluation will increase exports and reduce imports. 
However, a devaluation is not expected to significantly improve the country's 
balance of payments. 
Equation ( 11 ): A capital stock proxy (KPS) was constructed as current 
investment and investment in the previous two years. Estimated equations using 
the series developed by Reynolds ( 1980) were found to yield slightly poorer 
statistical results. 
1 The complete model and estimates of the equations in the model can be obtained from the 
authors on request. 
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The restrictions imposed on the model are largely the budget deficit and Bank of 
Mexico credit to the government. If GDP growth is to be promoted with price and 
exchange rate stability, government expenditures must follow a growth path 
consistent with the financial capabilities of the publiG sector. Failure to do this will 
not only affect the government deficit, but domestic and foreign stability will most 
likely be impossible to achieve. Therefore, the relevant endogenous variables 
responding to different policy shocks are private investment, GDP, taxes, imports, 
private consumption, domestic credit, and the money supply. 
A channel through which government investment induces a multiplier process is 
included in the model. Government investment is determined exogenously while 
private investment depends on the infrastructure created by the public investment, 
foreign assets available for importing capital equipment, the peso-dollar exchange 
rate, and private savings. Private savings in turn respond to past investment needs 
and the government deficit. 
Government expenditures will mainly be financed initially by revenue coming 
from income and indirect taxes, exports, and imports. Four additional sources can 
finance these expenditures: credit from th.e private banking system, credit from the 
central bank, foreign credit, and credit from the nonbanking sector. 
Changes in international reserves are caused by movements in the balance of 
payments-the difference between exogenously fixed exports and endogenously 
determined imports. Since changes in international reserves are endogenous, part 
of the monetary base also becomes endogenous. Thus if the Bank of Mexico 
increases its financing of government deficits, it must reduce the amount of credit 
available to private banks if the inflationary risk involved in the creation of new 
money in excess of the trend is to be avoided. 
In summary, the main real endogeno\IS variables in the model are private 
investment, imports, taxes, government consumption, private savings, and foreign 
assets. All are determined mainly by the behavior of GDP, which in turn is heavily 
dependent of government investment.2 
ANALYSIS OF THE 1981-87 PERIOD 
A series of optimal control simulations of the economy were conducted to 
determine how the economy is affected by alternative stabilization policies. The 
model's exogenous variables were assumed to have the following values, which, by 
and large, reflect recent historical movements: an exchange rate of 90 pesos per 
dollar, annual growth rates of 6 percent for crude petroleum production and 
exports, 2.5 percent for U.S. real GDP, and 6 percent for U.S. consumer prices. 
The stable exchange rate is implicitly assumed to be a policy target of the 
government3 and the most viable from a longer run growth perspective ( del Rio 
1977; Laney 1979). 
• 2 See Carrado-Bravo ( 1982) for a recent macroeconomic analysis touching on several of 
these issues. 
3 A stable rate is also said to reduce investor uncertainty and facilitate investment and 
trade. See Dempsey ( ! 978a,b) for an excellent account of how fluctuating rates complicate 
business decision making. 
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NON-IMF "MILD" STABILIZATION PROGRAM 
The initial run represents a non-IMF simulation since government deficits are 
not reduced as specified in the letter of intent. The only objective specified is to 
maximize real GDP by 1987 with a gradual reduction of annual inflation to 20 
percent by 1987. This program depicts the mildest stabilization program open to 
the government. Government internal borrowing and Bank of Mexico credit were 
both assumed to grow at 20 percent annually, and private sector credit was 
allowed to increase at 30 percent per annum. 
The results4 indicate a continuation of past growth rates with real annual GDP 
growth of 5.9 percent. Inflation is quickly reduced to 20 percent, an indicator that 
the government would be successful in this area with little effort (Solis 1981 ). 
On the other hand, both the internal and external gap increase very rapidly. 
Even if the government were successful in equalizing the gaps through reducing 
private consumption, it is not likely that the export gap (eventually reaching 84. l 
billion pesos in 1987) could be covered by foreign capital inflows given the 
country's existing debt. Without a stricter stabilization effort, the outcome of this 
strategy would be a drastic reduction in the. growth rate of all major aggregates. 
THE IMF STABILIZATION PROGRAM I 
The IMF stabilization program I represents a fairly severe stabilization effort. 
Government internal borrowing and Bank of Mexico credit to the government and 
private sector from the monetary system are all set at 5 percent average annual 
increase for the 1982-87 period. The major constraint is that government deficits 
as a percentage of GNP are fixed at 8.5, 5.5, and 3.5 percent for the 1983, 1984, 
and 1985-87 time periods, respectively. Inflation is set at l 0 percent or less for 
1987. Given these constraints, government Investment is designed to maximize 
the level of real gross domestic product in 1987. 
The results indicate that more than likely a program along these lines would 
impose a severe shock to the economy. In particular, GDP would expand at an 
average annual growth rate of only 2.3 percent, real private investment at 4.6 
percent, total national savings would contract at 3.9 percent, and total investment 
would decline at 3.0 percent. If the domestic gap is brought into line with the 
external gap (through programs reducing private consumption) Mexico quickly 
becomes a capital exporter ( 1.2 billion pesos by 1984 ). In light of this, such a 
program would impose a severe burden on the economy and would be "overkill" in 
terms of bringing the country's resource gaps into a range where external financing 
considerations posed no particular constraints. 
THE IMF STABILIZATION PROGRAM II 
The IMF Program II attempts to determine the e~:tent to which the government 
deficit/GNP ratio could be reduced, given the constraint that inflation reach 10 
4Results of all simulations appear in Appendix 2. 
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percent by 1987 and that Mexico achieve a positive rate of GDP growth each year 
during the 1982-87 time period. All other assumptions are as in IMF Program 
I. 
As the results indicate, it would be impossible to reduce the government deficit/ 
GDP ratio below 7.5 percent in 1987. The ex ante domestic gap increases at an 
annual rate of 8.3 percent, requiring a significant reduction in private consumption 
in order to equate it ex post with the (smaller) external resource gap. 
If the necessary reduction in consumption could e achieved, Mexico's external 
financing requests stabilize at between 19.3 and 31.5 billion pesos compared to 
52.2 billion in 1981. These levels of capital inflow seem feasible, and indicate the 
iMF targets for the government's deficit may be too stringent and costly in terms of 
foregone increases in real output. Real GNP is projected at 4.0 percent annual 
average rate of growth with private investment growing at nearly I percent per 
annum by and -4. l percent decline in private investment under IMF I). However, 
given the insistence of the IMF on an extreme reduction in the deficit, this program 
may not be a viable compromise between the non-IMF program outlined above 
and IMF I. 
STABILIZATION PROGRAM IH 
An alternative policy to reduce the burden of the IMF government deficit target 
would be to undertake a major tax reform. Thus, part of the deficit adjustment 
would not be placed on expenditures and thus demand. Most authorities 
acknowledge that considerable scope for fiscal reform still exists. Assuming that 
the authorities have the political will to reform the tax structure, in Stabilization 
Program III govlernment current revenues increase at an annual average rate of 15 
percent over the 1982-87 period. The exogenous growth rates are as above. 
The results indicate the high payoff of government efforts of taxes are increased. 
Private investment expands at an annual average of 1.4 percent, real GDP at 4.2 
percent with overall investment expanding at 2.1 percent, inflation is reduced to 
3.9 percent by 1987, and importantly, the external gap declines at an annual rate 
of 11. 2 percent reaching 27. 3 billion pesos by 198 7. Furthermore, the program is 
consistent with increases in the standard of living as ex post private consumption 
expands at an average rate of 4.8 percent.5 
CONCLUSIONS 
In retrospect the Mexican cns1s of August 1982 was a financial panic 
dominated by a sharp shift in expectations (Cline 1982, pp. 107-108) and 
facilitated by a convertible currency. With imports down by 25 percent in the first 
four months of 1982 and exports in 1981 modestly higher, Mexico's external 
5 As a check on the sensitivity of the results to the choice of objective functions, 
Stabilization Program IV was run with the same assumptions as Program III except that the 
terminal capital stock in 1987 was maximized rather than real GDP. This makes little 
difference to the success of the program. 
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deficit promised to be smaller in 1982 than in 1981. The peso had been devalued 
and austerity measures begun. Moreover, Mexico's crisis was a cash-flow problem 
rather than a problem of insolvency. It remains to be seen whether Mexico and the 
world financial system will emerge from the episode relatively unscathed. 
The stabilization period will require a restricted level of government expendi-
ture. The analysis developed in this article indicates that strict programs such as 
IMF I cannot be implemented from a political point of view. Preliminary 
indications are that the government cannot cut expenditures in the required 
amount necessary for a successful program. 
If the real purpose of the IMF stabilization program is to restore Mexico's credit 
worthiness and debt-servicing capacity, a more relaxed program would be feasible 
especially from the political point of view. While IMF II would certainly restore 
confidence in Mexico, IMF III would go one step further and prepare Mexico for a 
period of sustained and noninflationary growth. The analysis indicates that the 
government's ability to increase tax revenues will ultimately determine whether 
the period of stabilization will be painful and contractionary, or simply austere 
with a quick return to a high growth path assured. 
Appendix I: Mexican Macroeconomic Forecasting Modela 
Dependent Variable 
A. NATIONAL INCOME BLOCK (constant prices) 
I. Private consumption (PCNP) 
2. Private investment (IPP) 
3. Private savings (PSP) 
4. Government consumption (GCNP) 
5. Current government revenue (GTP) 
6. Imports (ZP) 
7. Exports (EP) 
8. Bank of Mexico foreign assets (BMF AP) 
9. Net factor payments (NFPP) 
10. Change in stocks (ISNP) 
11. Gross domestic product (GDPNP) 
B. NOMINAL FINANCIAL MONETARY BLOCK 
12. Exports (E) 
13. Bank of Mexico domestic assets (BMDA) 
14. Bank of Mexico reserve money (BMRM) 
15. Gov't credit from monetary system (MSGC) 
16. Government domestic borrowing (FGFI) 
1 7. Private sector credit from monetary system 
(MSPL) 
18. Money Supply (Ml) 
Independent Variables 
(with Expected Sign) 
GDPNP, -GENANP 
IGPL, BMFAPL, -EXC, PSPL 
IPPL, -GDEFP 
GTP, MSGCP, DUMPET 
GDPNP, ZP, EP 
-IGP, -GMFAPL 
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Appendix I (continued) 
Dependent Variable 
Independent Variables 
(with Expected Sign) 
C. PRICE INDEX BLOCK 
19. Consumer Price Index (CPI) EXCESS, USCPI 
EXCESS, EXC 
DFGDPL, EXCESS 
20. Wholesale Price Index (WPI) 
21. Gross Domestic Product Deflator (DFGDP) 
a Estimated Equations based on 1951-81 period. L represents lagged one year; Pat end of 
symbol indicates deflation by GDP price deflator with 1975 = I 00; estimates are two-stage 
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Current government revenue 
Banking system credit to government 




United States GDP (1975 prices) 
Net factor payments 
Change in stocks 
Capital stock 
Labor force 
Mexican petroleum exports 
Crude petroleum production 
Bank of Mexico Domestic assets • 
Government domestic borrowing 
Bank of Mexico credit to government 
Private sector private credit from banking system 
Money supply 
Bank of Mexico reserve money 







United States consumer price index 
Consumer price index 
Wholesale price index 
Grodd domestic product deflator 
Dummy variable, shift from fixed to flexible exchange rate 
Excess monetary demand 
Appendix 2: Mexico: Macroeconomic Impacts of Alternative Stabilization 
Programs 1981-87 
Average Annual Growth 1981-87 
Non-IMF IMF IMF IMF 
Macroeconomic Variable Program JO II III 
Private consumption (ex ante) 4.9 4.8 4.3 4.0b 
Private consumption (ex post) 6.2 3.5 4.8 4.8 
Government consumption 3.6 -2.1 1.2 1.8 
Total consumption (ex ante) 4.3 3.7 3.9 3.7b 
Total consumption (ex post) 5.8 2.8 4.3 4.4 
Private savings 5.4 -8.4 -0.7 -7.3 
Private investment 5.9 -4.l 0.7 1.4 
Government investment 6.9 -2.9 1.6 2.3 
Change in stocks 4.5 2.5 4.6 4.8 
Total investment 6.4 -3.0 1.5 2.1 
Exports 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 
Net factor payments 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.4 
Imports (ex ante) 7.2 -1.2 3.3 4.2b 
Imports (ex post) 6.6 -0.6 2.5 3.1 
Gross domestic product (Supply) 5.9 2.3 4.0 4.2 
Gross domestic product (Demand) 6.2 3.1 4.6 4.7 
Supply-demand GNP 34.0 43.7 20.l 14.4b 
Gross domestic product (Export) 5.9 2.3 4.0 4.2 
Gross national product 5.9 2.1 3.9 4.1 
Total savings 5.1 -3.9 0.4 1.0 
Domestic GNP (ex ante) 32.6 8.9 0.5 13.l 
External GNP (ex ante) 24.2 66.4 13.3 IO.Sb 
GNP Difference 45.0 43.4 -17.6 14.4 
Domestic= External GNP (ex post) 10.0 20.8 -17.6 -12.2 
Government current revenue 6.2 7.2 8.5 15.8 
Government deficit 14.6 -17.7 -4.9 -38.0 
Government deficit/GNP 11.5 3.5 7.5 0.6c 
Rate of Inflation ( 1987) 17.4 6.0 4.3 3.9c 




470 Robert E. Looney and P.C. Frederiksen 
REFERENCES 
Carrado-Bravo, Francisco ( 1982) Oil, Money, and the Mexican Economy: An Econo-
metric Analysis. Boulder, CO: Westview. 
Cline, William R. (1982) Mexico's Crisis, The World's Peril. Foreign Policy (Winter). 
de! Rio, Abel Beltran ( 1977) Mexico's Troubled Economy: Peso Prognosis. Wharton 
Magazine 56 (Winter). 
Dempsey, James R. (1978a) The Mexican Back to Back Loan. Euromoney 69-75 
(May). 
Dempsey, James R. (1978b) Pesos or Dollars in Mexico? Euromoney 147-164 (June). 
Dorfman, Dan (1982) Downhill in Mexico. San Francisco Examiner, June 27, p. DI. 
Fitzgerald, E. V. K. ( 1979) The Fiscal Deficit and Development Finance: A Note on the 
Accumulation Balance in Mexico. University of Cambridge, Centre of Latin American 
Studies, Working Paper No. 35, April. 
Friedman, Alan ( 1982) A Colossal Mountain of Debt. Financial Times, August 20, p. 13. 
International Monetary Fund ( 1983) Mexico to Use Resources from Fund to Support 
Major Adjustment Effort. IMF Survey, January 10, pp. 1-2. 
Laney, Leroy 0. ( 1979) Oil Inflation and the Mexican Peso. Voice of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas 3 (September). 
Looney, Robert ( 1982) Mexico's Fiscal Crisis: A Critique of the Fitzgerald Thesis. Paper 
presented at the Southern Economic Association Meeting, Atlanta, GA, November 10. 
Riding, Alan (1981) The Mixed Blessing of Mexico's Oil. New York Times Magazine, 
January 11, pp. 22-59. 
Riding, Alan (1982) Mexico to Accept Strict IMF Terms for Major Credit. New York 
Times, November 11, p. I. 
Solis, Leopoldo ( 1981) Economic Policy Reform in Mexico. New York: Pergamon, p. 119. 
